

## ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AND THE Great Central Campaign

The Important Position of Kentucky and Tennessee.

By JOHN McELROY.

### CHAPTER XXVIII.

#### DAYS OF AGONY FOR ROSECRANS.

Fervent Activity to Concentrate the Army—McCook's Mistaken March—For Two Days He Is Lost to the Army—Bragg Kindly Waits Till the Concentration Is Completed.

A view from the commanding mountain tops on Sept. 12 of the valleys and passes filled with troops massing against Negley was a rude awakening for Rosecrans from his dream that he had Bragg on the run. Bragg was there, in the center of four miles of long, thin, disconnected line of 65 miles, with a mighty army, closed in mass, and a mind full of fierce aggression. The next five days were terrible ones for Rosecrans. If Bragg moved with ordinary energy and skill nothing short of the miraculous could save the Army of the Cumberland. In his fear and anxiety, however, Rosecrans's strategy hand did not lose its cunning. He gave his orders instantly, and they were clear and well conceived. Thomas was to move to the left behind the gorge of Chickamauga Creek and connect with Crittenden, who was to throw two of his divisions back in echelon from Lee & Gordon's Mills to Rossville to protect the road through Mission Ridge to Chattanooga. McCook was to march to the left through McLamore's Cove to join Thomas. Gordon Granger was to leave Bridgeport and the line of communications to the new troops arriving and come forward with all the troops that he could gather.

The night of Sept. 11 saw McCook, far on the right, halt on his march to Summerville, before Forrest's stubborn resistance, and, alarmed by the news of Bragg's concentration at Lafayette, concentrate his corps at Alpine. He sent his trains back up on Lookout Mountain.

Thomas had Negley and Baird at Davis's Crossroads, in McLamore's Cove, and Reynolds's and Brannan's on Lookout Mountain behind them, coming through Stevens's Gap.

Crittenden, who had gone with two divisions to Ringgold, and sent on Wilder toward Tunnel Hill and Dalton, had, as we have seen, recognized his great danger, and was hurrying back to get behind Chickamauga Creek and in supporting distance of Thomas.

In the evening of Sept. 13 Thomas had his entire corps in McLamore's Cove, in the roads leading from Stevens's Gap to Dug Gap, and from Chickamauga Creek to Catlett's Gap. In the strong position he took up he had force enough to repel anything that Bragg might throw against him. Crittenden was 13 miles down the Chickamauga, with his three divisions in supporting distance of one another around Lee & Gordon's Mills. On the evening of Sept. 12 McCook had reached Rosecrans's position to move over into the Chickamauga Valley and join on to Thomas.

McCook showed his usual infidelity in executing orders at critical times. Rosecrans had expected, and indeed or-

of the corps started back over Lookout Mountain by the road by which he had come. He reached Lookout Valley on the 15th, marched down to Johnston's Creek, and then recrossed Lookout Mountain.

Later in the evening Bragg sent Polk two urgent orders to attack sharply at "day-dawn." At 11 o'clock Polk replied, stating that he had taken a strong position for defense, and asking that he be heavily reinforced.

Bragg replied by an imperative order

not to defer his attack. He added that Polk was much stronger than his enemy, and that all that was necessary was a prompt and vigorous attack. Distrustful of Polk, Bragg ordered Buckner's troops to be ready to move. At daybreak he marched at their head toward Lee & Gordon's Mills, to find that Polk had not moved, and that Crittenden had gotten his corps together behind the Chickamauga.

Polk again, Bragg remained substantially idle for four days, which precious time was well employed by Rosecrans in getting his army together.

Rosecrans Concentrates.

Believing that Bragg would move directly up the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, Rosecrans planned to meet him where the road crosses the deep gorge of Chickamauga Creek, at Lee & Gordon's Mills. He was now handling his troops as if life and death depended upon their concentration. Keeping constant watch upon Dug and Catlett's Gaps, to prevent Bragg rushing through them, to turn his right flank, and cut off McCook, Thomas gradually extended his left to connect with Crittenden. There was a mortal necessity, now that everyone knew of Bragg's immense reinforcements, that Thomas should connect securely with both the right and left wings. It is beyond explanation why during these four momentous days Bragg did not carry out his plan of throwing enough troops on to Crittenden to crush him, and march on the heels of the fugitives into Chattanooga. He had the men and the opportunity to do this, but for some reason he did not avail himself of his supreme chance. McCook's last army in McLamore's Cove Sept. 17, and connected with Thomas's right at Pond Spring. Thereupon Thomas moved toward Crittenden, near Crawfish Springs.

McCook posted Sheridan at the foot of Stevens's Gap, Davis in observation of Dug Gap, and Johnson at Pond Spring to watch Catlett's Gap.

Gordon Granger, with the Reserve Corps, was stationed in Ross's Gap, the gateway to Chattanooga. He sent out Gen. Steedman to make a reconnaissance toward Ringgold. Steedman found indications of a very heavy force in that direction, and the columns of dust rising above the trees showed that more were moving up. Rosecrans rightly interpreted this to mean that Bragg was feinting with his left on Rosecrans's right, with the real intention of turning his left and interposing between him and Chattanooga. Thereupon Rosecrans began a general movement to the left.

The Terrain.

The terrain on which the two armies were now gathered for the greatest battle in the West, and one of the bloodiest encounters in all history, was the valley between Mission Ridge and Pigeon Mountain.

Mission Ridge starts off from Lookout Mountain at Dougherty's Gap at a sharp angle, like a limb from a tree. Pigeon Mountain starts off from Lookout Mountain at about the same angle, a few miles farther south, and the two run nearly parallel, trending to the northeast. The valley between them is drained by the West Fork of the Chickamauga, as the East Fork drains the upper part of the valley between Pigeon Mountain and Taylor's Ridge. Near Lee & Gordon's Mills Pigeon Mountain sinks down into the rolling broken uplands that extend from Mission Ridge to Taylor's Ridge. Ringgold is at the principal gap through the latter. Peavine Creek runs between the two branches and empties into the eastern end of the valley. The two branches come together some four or five miles from where the

would have been to lure Crittenden farther on toward Dalton, when nothing could have saved him but such inexcusable blundering of Bragg's lieutenants as at Dug Gap.

Bragg supposed that only one of Crittenden's divisions had gone to Ringgold, and he ordered Polk to move to Lee & Gordon's Mills, and attack the division he found there. Sept. 12, at 6 p. m., Bragg wrote Polk:

"This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division is crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on to Wilder, so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success."

Later in the evening Bragg sent Polk two urgent orders to attack sharply at "day-dawn." At 11 o'clock Polk replied, stating that he had taken a strong position for defense, and asking that he be heavily reinforced.

Bragg replied by an imperative order

not to defer his attack. He added that Polk was much stronger than his enemy, and that all that was necessary was a prompt and vigorous attack. Distrustful of Polk, Bragg ordered Buckner's troops to be ready to move. At daybreak he marched at their head toward Lee & Gordon's Mills, to find that Polk had not moved, and that Crittenden had gotten his corps together behind the Chickamauga.

Polk again, Bragg remained substantially idle for four days, which precious time was well employed by Rosecrans in getting his army together.

Rosecrans Concentrates.

Believing that Bragg would move directly up the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, Rosecrans planned to meet him where the road crosses the deep gorge of Chickamauga Creek, at Lee & Gordon's Mills. He was now handling his troops as if life and death depended upon their concentration. Keeping constant watch upon Dug and Catlett's Gaps, to prevent Bragg rushing through them, to turn his right flank, and cut off McCook, Thomas gradually extended his left to connect with Crittenden. There was a mortal necessity, now that everyone knew of Bragg's immense reinforcements, that Thomas should connect securely with both the right and left wings. It is beyond explanation why during these four momentous days Bragg did not carry out his plan of throwing enough troops on to Crittenden to crush him, and march on the heels of the fugitives into Chattanooga. He had the men and the opportunity to do this, but for some reason he did not avail himself of his supreme chance. McCook's last army in McLamore's Cove Sept. 17, and connected with Thomas's right at Pond Spring. Thereupon Thomas moved toward Crittenden, near Crawfish Springs.

McCook posted Sheridan at the foot of Stevens's Gap, Davis in observation of Dug Gap, and Johnson at Pond Spring to watch Catlett's Gap.

Gordon Granger, with the Reserve Corps, was stationed in Ross's Gap, the gateway to Chattanooga. He sent out Gen. Steedman to make a reconnaissance toward Ringgold. Steedman found indications of a very heavy force in that direction, and the columns of dust rising above the trees showed that more were moving up. Rosecrans rightly interpreted this to mean that Bragg was feinting with his left on Rosecrans's right, with the real intention of turning his left and interposing between him and Chattanooga. Thereupon Rosecrans began a general movement to the left.

The Terrain.

The terrain on which the two armies were now gathered for the greatest battle in the West, and one of the bloodiest encounters in all history, was the valley between Mission Ridge and Pigeon Mountain.

Mission Ridge starts off from Lookout Mountain at Dougherty's Gap at a sharp angle, like a limb from a tree. Pigeon Mountain starts off from Lookout Mountain at about the same angle, a few miles farther south, and the two run nearly parallel, trending to the northeast. The valley between them is drained by the West Fork of the Chickamauga, as the East Fork drains the upper part of the valley between Pigeon Mountain and Taylor's Ridge. Near Lee & Gordon's Mills Pigeon Mountain sinks down into the rolling broken uplands that extend from Mission Ridge to Taylor's Ridge. Ringgold is at the principal gap through the latter. Peavine Creek runs between the two branches and empties into the eastern end of the valley. The two branches come together some four or five miles from where the

stream empties into the Tennessee, four miles from Dalton.

Mission Ridge is a much lower and gentler elevation than Lookout Mountain. It is nowhere more than 450 feet high. It can be crossed almost anywhere on foot, though there are but two wagon roads across it. The best of these is at Rossville, or Ross's Gap, four miles south of Chattanooga, which was once the headquarters of the Cherokee Indians, and the place takes its name from John Ross, a noted Cherokee chief, whose house is still standing there. Through this came the great highway, centuries old, since the modern road was built on the old Indian trail, leading from Chattanooga to Lafayette, Rome and Atlanta.

Two miles south of Rossville is the other pass—McFarland's Gap—through which runs a fairly good road. These points had already become of vital interest to both armies. The foothills of Mission Ridge extend to the Chickamauga at Lee & Gordon's Mills, but fade down rapidly to the northward, making tolerably level and much swampy ground about where the two branches of the Chickamauga unite. Here are many little farms with cultivated fields.

Above Lee & Gordon's Mills the Chickamauga, like all the mountain streams in that region, runs through a deep gorge, with perpendicular walls of limestone, making its passage difficult, except at bridges and prepared crossings. Below Lee & Gordon's Mills the stream widens and the banks become lower and less precipitous, but still bridges were very desirable, though it was the dry season of the year, when fording was practicable. There were several bridges below Lee & Gordon's Mills. Alexander's Bridge, some three miles below, and Reed's Bridge, about the same distance below Alexander's; Dyer's Bridge and the Red House Bridge, on the road from Rossville to Ringgold.

It is said that the Indian meaning of Chickamauga is "the river of death," and it received it on account of a terrible battle there, or a pestilence which proved particularly fatal to the tribe.

Bragg's Plan of Battle.

McCook's fatal delay of two days in joining the army compelled Rosecrans to accept battle behind the Chickamauga, instead of, as he had hoped, in much stronger positions on Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain. He hoped that Bragg would move up directly from Lafayette, and attack him behind the gorges of the upper Chickamauga. As usual, your enemy never does the thing you want him to do, nor fights over the ground you have prepared.

Bragg having sinned away his great opportunity for defeating the Army of the Cumberland in detail, determined to attack it in mass and crush it by the force of numbers. His plan of battle was similar to those which had given him so much success at Perryville and Stone River. He would threaten, even engage Rosecrans's right near Lee & Gordon's Mills, but throw the bulk of his army across the Chickamauga lower down, where the open fields and more level ground would enable him to use his superiority in numbers to advantage. There he would crush Rosecrans's left, seize the Lafayette road, interpose between him and Chattanooga, and destroy the shattered army as it attempted to escape through the narrow pass of McFarland's Gap. This was an admirable plan, and came perilously near succeeding. All that prevented it was that Gen. Thomas and his men fought with a desperate tenacity that no man could have foreseen. Such things spoil the best plans.

Bragg issued his battle order on the evening of Sept. 17. It read:

"1. (Bushrod) Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's Mills.

"2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

"3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement on the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee & Gordon's Mills.

"4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee & Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be concentrated.

"5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain the enemy's intention, and if Lee & Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.

"6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover our left and bring up stragglers.

"7. All teams, etc., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the rear, and when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.

"8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor and persistence.

This meant that D. H. Hill, with one corps, was to act as the pivot for a grand left wheel, with one-half of Bragg's army crossing the Chickamauga and attacking the Union left. Hill was to hold the Union center and right near Lee & Gordon's Mills, until the left was driven back across the Lafayette road. When he was taken advantage of the confusion to cross the Chickamauga and help complete the victory. Bragg expected to open the battle with a successful attack, and again his plans miscarried, as his subordinates could not execute the prescribed movements in time.

Rosecrans's Dispositions.

Minty and Wilder and reconnaissance by infantry commanders kept Rosecrans informed of the movements of the enemy, and of dust rising to the northeast beyond the Chickamauga confirmed their reports. Rosecrans saw, Sept. 13, that the probabilities were increasing that he would have to make his main fight for possession of the Lafayette road. The noisy demonstrations up the Chickamauga on his right were merely a feint to attract attention. At 4 p. m. he ordered Thomas to move with his whole corps to the Kelly Farm, which would command the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.

McCook was to move up and occupy the ground which Thomas had vacated. Crittenden was to act as general reserve. Granger was to send out from Rossville forces to watch the lower crossings of the Chickamauga.

The head of Thomas's column reached Kelly's Farm about daylight, Sept. 13, with Baird's Division leading. Gen. Thomas thus describes his position and dispositions:

"Kelly's house is situated in an opening about three-fourths of a mile long and one-fourth of a mile wide, on the east side of the State road, and stretches along that road in a northerly direction, with a small field of perhaps 20

stream empties into the Tennessee, four miles from Dalton.

Mission Ridge is a much lower and gentler elevation than Lookout Mountain. It is nowhere more than 450 feet high. It can be crossed almost anywhere on foot, though there are but two wagon roads across it. The best of these is at Rossville, or Ross's Gap, four miles south of Chattanooga, which was once the headquarters of the Cherokee Indians, and the place takes its name from John Ross, a noted Cherokee chief, whose house is still standing there. Through this came the great highway, centuries old, since the modern road was built on the old Indian trail, leading from Chattanooga to Lafayette, Rome and Atlanta.

Two miles south of Rossville is the other pass—McFarland's Gap—through which runs a fairly good road. These points had already become of vital interest to both armies. The foothills of Mission Ridge extend to the Chickamauga at Lee & Gordon's Mills, but fade down rapidly to the northward, making tolerably level and much swampy ground about where the two branches of the Chickamauga unite. Here are many little farms with cultivated fields.

Above Lee & Gordon's Mills the Chickamauga, like all the mountain streams in that region, runs through a deep gorge, with perpendicular walls of limestone, making its passage difficult, except at bridges and prepared crossings. Below Lee & Gordon's Mills the stream widens and the banks become lower and less precipitous, but still bridges were very desirable, though it was the dry season of the year, when fording was practicable. There were several bridges below Lee & Gordon's Mills. Alexander's Bridge, some three miles below, and Reed's Bridge, about the same distance below Alexander's; Dyer's Bridge and the Red House Bridge, on the road from Rossville to Ringgold.

It is said that the Indian meaning of Chickamauga is "the river of death," and it received it on account of a terrible battle there, or a pestilence which proved particularly fatal to the tribe.

Bragg's Plan of Battle.

McCook's fatal delay of two days in joining the army compelled Rosecrans to accept battle behind the Chickamauga, instead of, as he had hoped, in much stronger positions on Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain. He hoped that Bragg would move up directly from Lafayette, and attack him behind the gorges of the upper Chickamauga. As usual, your enemy never does the thing you want him to do, nor fights over the ground you have prepared.

Bragg having sinned away his great opportunity for defeating the Army of the Cumberland in detail, determined to attack it in mass and crush it by the force of numbers. His plan of battle was similar to those which had given him so much success at Perryville and Stone River. He would threaten, even engage Rosecrans's right near Lee & Gordon's Mills, but throw the bulk of his army across the Chickamauga lower down, where the open fields and more level ground would enable him to use his superiority in numbers to advantage. There he would crush Rosecrans's left, seize the Lafayette road, interpose between him and Chattanooga, and destroy the shattered army as it attempted to escape through the narrow pass of McFarland's Gap. This was an admirable plan, and came perilously near succeeding. All that prevented it was that Gen. Thomas and his men fought with a desperate tenacity that no man could have foreseen. Such things spoil the best plans.

Bragg issued his battle order on the evening of Sept. 17. It read:

"1. (Bushrod) Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's Mills.

"2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

"3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement on the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee & Gordon's Mills.

"4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee & Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be concentrated.

"5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain the enemy's intention, and if Lee & Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.

"6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover our left and bring up stragglers.

"7. All teams, etc., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the rear, and when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.

"8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor and persistence.

This meant that D. H. Hill, with one corps, was to act as the pivot for a grand left wheel, with one-half of Bragg's army crossing the Chickamauga and attacking the Union left. Hill was to hold the Union center and right near Lee & Gordon's Mills, until the left was driven back across the Lafayette road. When he was taken advantage of the confusion to cross the Chickamauga and help complete the victory. Bragg expected to open the battle with a successful attack, and again his plans miscarried, as his subordinates could not execute the prescribed movements in time.

Rosecrans's Dispositions.

Minty and Wilder and reconnaissance by infantry commanders kept Rosecrans informed of the movements of the enemy, and of dust rising to the northeast beyond the Chickamauga confirmed their reports. Rosecrans saw, Sept. 13, that the probabilities were increasing that he would have to make his main fight for possession of the Lafayette road. The noisy demonstrations up the Chickamauga on his right were merely a feint to attract attention. At 4 p. m. he ordered Thomas to move with his whole corps to the Kelly Farm, which would command the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.

McCook was to move up and occupy the ground which Thomas had vacated. Crittenden was to act as general reserve. Granger was to send out from Rossville forces to watch the lower crossings of the Chickamauga.

The head of Thomas's column reached Kelly's Farm about daylight, Sept. 13, with Baird's Division leading. Gen. Thomas thus describes his position and dispositions:

"Kelly's house is situated in an opening about three-fourths of a mile long and one-fourth of a mile wide, on the east side of the State road, and stretches along that road in a northerly direction, with a small field of perhaps 20

stream empties into the Tennessee, four miles from Dalton.

Mission Ridge is a much lower and gentler elevation than Lookout Mountain. It is nowhere more than 450 feet high. It can be crossed almost anywhere on foot, though there are but two wagon roads across it. The best of these is at Rossville, or Ross's Gap, four miles south of Chattanooga, which was once the headquarters of the Cherokee Indians, and the place takes its name from John Ross, a noted Cherokee chief, whose house is still standing there. Through this came the great highway, centuries old, since the modern road was built on the old Indian trail, leading from Chattanooga to Lafayette, Rome and Atlanta.

Two miles south of Rossville is the other pass—McFarland's Gap—through which runs a fairly good road. These points had already become of vital interest to both armies. The foothills of Mission Ridge extend to the Chickamauga at Lee & Gordon's Mills, but fade down rapidly to the northward, making tolerably level and much swampy ground about where the two branches of the Chickamauga unite. Here are many little farms with cultivated fields.

Above Lee & Gordon's Mills the Chickamauga, like all the mountain streams in that region, runs through a deep gorge, with perpendicular walls of limestone, making its passage difficult, except at bridges and prepared crossings. Below Lee & Gordon's Mills the stream widens and the banks become lower and less precipitous, but still bridges were very desirable, though it was the dry season of the year, when fording was practicable. There were several bridges below Lee & Gordon's Mills. Alexander's Bridge, some three miles below, and Reed's Bridge, about the same distance below Alexander's; Dyer's Bridge and the Red House Bridge, on the road from Rossville to Ringgold.

It is said that the Indian meaning of Chickamauga is "the river of death," and it received it on account of a terrible battle there, or a pestilence which proved particularly fatal to the tribe.

Bragg's Plan of Battle.

McCook's fatal delay of two days in joining the army compelled Rosecrans to accept battle behind the Chickamauga, instead of, as he had hoped, in much stronger positions on Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain. He hoped that Bragg would move up directly from Lafayette, and attack him behind the gorges of the upper Chickamauga. As usual, your enemy never does the thing you want him to do, nor fights over the ground you have prepared.

Bragg having sinned away his great opportunity for defeating the Army of the Cumberland in detail, determined to attack it in mass and crush it by the force of numbers. His plan of battle was similar to those which had given him so much success at Perryville and Stone River. He would threaten, even engage Rosecrans's right near Lee & Gordon's Mills, but throw the bulk of his army across the Chickamauga lower down, where the open fields and more level ground would enable him to use his superiority in numbers to advantage. There he would crush Rosecrans's left, seize the Lafayette road, interpose between him and Chattanooga, and destroy the shattered army as it attempted to escape through the narrow pass of McFarland's Gap. This was an admirable plan, and came perilously near succeeding. All that prevented it was that Gen. Thomas and his men fought with a desperate tenacity that no man could have foreseen. Such things spoil the best plans.

Bragg issued his battle order on the evening of Sept. 17. It read:

"1. (Bushrod) Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's Mills.

"2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

"3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement on the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee & Gordon's Mills.

"4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee & Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be concentrated.

"5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain the enemy's intention, and if Lee & Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.

"6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover our left and bring up stragglers.

"7. All teams, etc., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the rear, and when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.

"8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor and persistence.

This meant that D. H. Hill, with one corps, was to act as the pivot for a grand left wheel, with one-half of Bragg's army crossing the Chickamauga and attacking the Union left. Hill was to hold the Union center and right near Lee & Gordon's Mills, until the left was driven back across the Lafayette road. When he was taken advantage of the confusion to cross the Chickamauga and help complete the victory. Bragg expected to open the battle with a successful attack, and again his plans miscarried, as his subordinates could not execute the prescribed movements in time.

Rosecrans's Dispositions.

Minty and Wilder and reconnaissance by infantry commanders kept Rosecrans informed of the movements of the enemy, and of dust rising to the northeast beyond the Chickamauga confirmed their reports. Rosecrans saw, Sept. 13, that the probabilities were increasing that he would have to make his main fight for possession of the Lafayette road. The noisy demonstrations up the Chickamauga on his right were merely a feint to attract attention. At 4 p. m. he ordered Thomas to move with his whole corps to the Kelly Farm, which would command the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.

McCook was to move up and occupy the ground which Thomas had vacated. Crittenden was to act as general reserve. Granger was to send out from Rossville forces to watch the lower crossings of the Chickamauga.

The head of Thomas's column reached Kelly's Farm about daylight, Sept. 13, with Baird's Division leading. Gen. Thomas thus describes his position and dispositions:

"Kelly's house is situated in an opening about three-fourths of a mile long and one-fourth of a mile wide, on the east side of the State road, and stretches along that road in a northerly direction, with a small field of perhaps 20

## THE PIKE'S PEAK CENTENARY.

A Grand Celebration to Be Made of the 100th Anniversary of the Discovery of Colorado's Principal Mountain.

Beginning Sunday, Sept. 23, the State of Colorado will have a gala week to celebrate her own self-satisfaction over it, and advertise to the world the marvelous progress she has made since first her soil was visited by Americans. The center of the celebration will be at Colorado Springs, at the foot of Pike's Peak. That pretty little city has been roused to do her utmost, and she will be assisted in making the occasion notable by the State of Colorado and the United States Government. It is expected that people from all over the Rocky Mountain regions will join in



GEN. ZEBULON M. PIKE.

the celebration and assist in making it a brilliant success. The Government will send several thousand Regular soldiers, cavalry, artillery and infantry, from the posts in the Rocky Mountain regions; the great Indian tribes, Pawnees, Arapahoes, Comanches, Cheyennes and others, will send delegations in full war costume; the cowboys will rally from the plains in great numbers; the Grand Army Posts will meet in Reunion and parade, and besides these will be pioneer societies, veterans of the Spanish War, the Colorado National Guard, secret societies and other organizations. The program includes military parades, Indian war dances, cowboy exhibits, automobile, golf and other tournaments. A memorial will be unveiled to Gen. Zebulon M. Pike, Pike's Peak will be illuminated and there will be an exhibit of Colorado's mineralogical and other resources. An attempt will be



CHART OF PIKE'S PEAK.

made to present a panorama of Colorado's development. The Denver Mint is casting 100,000 souvenir medallions. The Governors of the neighboring States have promised to be present, and speeches are pledged from Vice President Fairbanks, Secretary of State Sherman, Secretary Shaw, Attorney-General Moody, Senator Teller and others. The event which is made the reason of the celebration was Capt. Pike's first sight of Pike's Peak, the principal mountain in Colorado, which occurred Nov. 16, 1806. The exigencies of Colorado weather make it safer and more pleasant to celebrate the centenary in September rather than on its actual date.

Who Pike Was.

Zebulon Montgomery Pike was an excellent type of the soldiers who have made the American Army famous for courage, resolution and enterprise. He was born in Lambert, N. J., Jan. 2, 1773, and was consequently 27 years old when he made his momentous exploration. His father was a Revolutionary soldier, commanding a company in the New Jersey line, entered the Regular Army at its formation in 1789 as a Captain and rose to the rank of brevet Lieutenant-Colonel. When young Pike was 20 years old he was given a commission as Second Lieutenant in the 2d U. S., and by 1806 had risen to the rank of Captain. He was an earnest, methodical young man, full of enterprise and daring, but carefully planning all that he undertook, and after providing for all the details, carrying out his plan with inflexible resolution. The human side was strongly developed, which is shown by his relations with the Indians, to whom he was always friendly and with whom he succeeded in maintaining the best relations. He gained so much reputation by his explorations that he was promoted successively to Major, Lieutenant-Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster and, finally, at the outbreak of the War of 1812, was made Colonel of the 16th U. S., one of the new regi-

all that western country. Pike took with him 50 Osages and Pawnees, who had been prisoners among the Pottawatomies and whom he was to deliver to their friends along the Osage River and in Kansas, and thus make himself doubly welcome to those powerful tribes of Indians. Pike took his party up the Missouri in the clumsy keel boats which were used for transportation in those days, and arriving at the mouth of the Osage, which runs from Kansas directly across Missouri, turned into that stream, and polling, pushing and towing his boats up the Osage, finally reached the Osage villages in what is now western Missouri. The Osage prisoners naturally had become dissatisfied with the slowness of their progress, and begged to be allowed to go on overland. Pike acceded to their request, and detailed Lieut. Wilkinson to escort them. Wilkinson gives this account of his arrival at the Osage villages:

"When within a mile of the town, the Chief, Tutasagay, or the Wind, desired a regular procession might be observed, and accordingly he placed me between himself and his first warrior, and the ransomed captives followed by files. Half a mile from the village we were met by 150 horsemen, painted and decorated in a very fanciful manner. These were considered as a guard of honor, and on our approach opened to the right and left, leaving us a sufficient space to pass through."

"A few hundred yards in advance, on the right, I perceived 60 or more horsemen, painted with a blue chalk, which the Chief observed to be the command of a halt, and sent forth his younger brother, Nezuma, or the Rain that Walks, with a flag and silk handkerchief, as a prize for the swiftest horseman. At a given signal they started off at full speed, the two foremost taking the flag and handkerchief, and the rest containing themselves with having shown their agility and skill."

"As I entered the village I was saluted by a discharge from four swivels (which the Indians had taken from an old fort erected by the Spaniards on the river), and passed through a crowd of nearly 1,000 persons, part of whom I learned were of the Grand Village. I was immediately, but with ceremony, ushered into the lodge of the Soldier of the Oak, who, after having paid me some very handsome compliments, courteously invited me to eat of green corn, buffalo meat and watermelons about the size of a 24-pound shot, which, though small, were highly flavored."

Only One Flag.

Pike was an early and very firm exponent of the doctrine that there could be but one flag in this country. He says of his councils with the "Pawnee Republic":

"The Spaniards had left several of their flags in this village, one of which was unfurled at the Chief's door on the day of the Grand Council. Among the various demands and charges that I made was that this flag should be delivered to me, and one of the United States flags received and hoisted in its place. This was probably carrying the pride of Nations a little too far, as there had so lately been a large force of Spanish cavalry at the village, which made a great impression upon the minds of the young men as to their

power, consequence, etc., which my appearance with 25 Indians was by no means calculated to remove. After the chiefs had replied to various parts of my discourse, but were silent as to the flag, I again reiterated my demand for the flag, adding that it was impossible for the Nation to have two fathers; that they must either be the children of the Spaniards or acknowledge their American father. After a silence of some time an old man rose, went to the door, took down the Spanish flag and laid it at my feet, and then received the American flag and elevated it on the staff which had lately borne the standard of his Catholic Majesty. This gave great satisfaction to the Osages and Kansas, both of whom decidedly avowed themselves to be under the American protection."

Osages and Pawnees.

Pike found the Pawnees to be much inferior to the Osages in courage, honesty and cleanliness, but superior to them in horse-raising. He told the Pawnees were degenerate, and attributed this to the ease with which they obtained their food from the buffalo. They raised much corn and pumpkins, which afforded a little thickening to their soup during the year. Their pumpkins they cut into thin slices and dry in the sun, which reduces them to a small size, and not more than a tenth of their weight."

Pike found the Pawnee village on the Nebraska River, near what is now the Nebraska line. He then turned to find the Pawnee village, and he was persistently opposed to any further advance into their country. They had succeeded in persuading the Spaniards to go back, and were resolute that the Americans should do the same. Finally the Chief said that he would stop him by force of arms, to which Pike replied: "That I had been sent out by our Great Father to explore the western

power, consequence, etc., which my appearance with 25 Indians was by no means calculated to remove. After the chiefs had replied to various parts of my discourse, but were silent as to the flag, I again reiterated my demand for the flag, adding that it was impossible for the Nation to have two fathers; that they must either be the children of the Spaniards or acknowledge their American father. After a silence of some time an old man rose, went to the door, took down the Spanish flag and laid it at my feet, and then received the American flag and elevated it on the staff which had lately borne the standard of his Catholic Majesty. This gave great satisfaction to the Osages and Kansas, both of whom decidedly avowed themselves to be under the American protection."

Osages and Pawnees.

Pike found the Pawnees to be much inferior to the Osages in courage, honesty and cleanliness, but superior to them in horse-raising. He told the Pawnees were degenerate, and attributed this to the ease with which they obtained their food from the buffalo. They raised much corn and pumpkins, which afforded a little thickening to their soup during the year. Their pumpkins they cut into thin slices and dry in the sun, which reduces them to a small size, and not more than a tenth of their weight."

Pike found the Pawnee village on the Nebraska River, near what is now the Nebraska line. He then turned to find the Pawnee village, and he was persistently opposed to any further advance into their country. They had succeeded in persuading the Spaniards to go back, and were resolute that the Americans should do the same. Finally the Chief said that he would stop him by force of arms, to which Pike replied: "That I had been sent out by our Great Father to explore the western



POSITION OF THE ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF SEPT. 17, 1863.

dered, that he move by the left flank, taking the road leading along the eastern base of Lookout Mountain. This was a direct, easy, practicable route. It meant a march along a good road from Alpine to Negley's Gap, where the road ascends Lookout Mountain, thence runs over the plateau of the Mountain to Dougherty's Gap, through which it descends to the head of the Valley of the Chickamauga.

McCook knew nothing of this road, and did not want to venture into it. Probably he was alarmed by the nearness of Bragg in heavy force, and feared he would interpose between him and Thomas. He put a brigade from each division under Gen. Lytle to guard the trains and the passes, and with the rest

(Continued on page two.)

(Continued on page two.)